

Making the World Safer

CTR RUSSIAN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) SECURITY PROGRAM

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NDIA Security Division Symposium & Exhibition Reston, VA 27 June 2002

The Strategic Challenge Of The New Millennium



"The Defense Threat Reduction Agency safeguards America and its friends from weapons of mass destruction by reducing the present threat and preparing for the future threat."



DTRA Is a Defense Combat Support Agency



The Pentagon


Reporting to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs



McNamara HQC Building



DTRA Is Organized According to Mission Functions





CTR Mission

Provide assistance to eligible states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) in order to dismantle weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to reduce the threat of WMD proliferation



CTR Mission Objectives

- Objective 1: Dismantle Former Soviet Union (FSU) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Associated Infrastructure,
- Objective 2: Consolidate and Secure FSU WMD and Related Technology and Materials,
- Objective 3: Increase Transparency and Encourage Higher Standards of Conduct, and
- Objective 4: Support Defense and Military Cooperation With the Objective of Preventing Proliferation.



CTR WMD Security Program

- CTR Missions Accomplished Through the CTR Umbrella Agreements
- Program Goals:
 - Enhance security of nuclear weapons in Russia
 - Enhance security of biological weapons in FSU
 - Enhance security of chemical weapons in Russia
 - Enhance security of fissile material storage facility in Mayak, Russia



US & Russian Nuclear Security Standards

ORGANIZATIONAL

DoD 5210.41

...DoD guidance supplemented by each Services' unique regulations...

TECHNOLOGICAL

DoD

...Nuclear equipment testing, training, and integration unique to each Service... Russian Forces
Directive No 264

...Top-level direction for national nuclear security mission. MOD responsible for execution with military services.

MOD

...Nuclear equipment testing, training, and integration across all MOD...




Nuclear Weapons Storage Security Projects



Security Assessment and Training Center (SATC) -- Sergiev Posad



Center for Technological Diagnostics



Nuclear Weapons Storage Site Enhancements



Automated Inventory Control and Management System





Guard Force Training





Making the World Safer

WMD Physical Protection System (PPS) Stages

- Security Assessment and Training Facility (SATC) Test PPS equipment
- **Security Enhancements** used for MOD immediate security needs
- Urgent Quick Fix PPS used to secure individual bunker perimeters
- Rapid Deployable Sensors used to satisfy temporary security needs
- Controlled Area Fence used to secure stockpile site outer perimeters
- Comprehensive PPS additional tested and selected PPS equipment used to improve PPS security enhancements (example: CCTV & Interior Sensors)




Quick Fix PPS and MILPAC Rapid Deployable Sensor System





Security Assessment, Training, and Logistics (Security Assessment and Training Center - SATC)





SATC



• Project Description:

 The Security Assessment & Training Center (SATC) was constructed to enable DoD & MOD personnel to test, select, & integrate a PPS equipment required to enhance security at MOD WMD storage sites

• Activity:

- SecDef Cohen & MinDef Sergeev dedicated site Feb 98
- PPS testing completed and final comprehensive suite of equipment identified
 - Joint Task used over 40 MOD troops and American contractors
- Joint DoD-MOD Agreement of final comprehensive PPS suite in Oct 2001



Site Security Enhancements

(Quick Fix)







Equipment used at active Russian nuclear weapon storage sites



Site Security Enhancements (Quick Fix)

• Project Description:

- Provide 123 one km sets of perimeter security fencing consisting of an inner & outer layer of security fence (IZP) surrounding a vibration cable sensored fence with microwave sensors, installed at designated nuclear weapons storage structures to address urgent MOD security requirements
- Procured snowblowers, boilers, installation equipment, initial fire protection equipment to enhance nuclear security dismantlement operations

• Schedule:

 Russian funded Quick Fix installation continues at slow pace. Only one-third currently installed; original schedule was for MOD to complete by Dec 2000



Comprehensive PPS Suite Development

- Tested and selected PPS equipment from the following nine categories:
 - PPS Command and Control System (C2)
 - Closed-Circuit Television System (CCTV)
 - Intrusion Detection Equipment (Interior and exterior IDS)
 - Rapid Deployable Sensor Systems
 - Access Control Systems
 - Vehicle/Personnel Barrier and access delay systems
 - Hazardous/Prohibited Material Detection Systems (metal, explosive, nuclear)
 - Fire and Safety System
 - Guard Force Equipment






Delivery of Comprehensive PPS Suite

• Project Description:

- Obtain pre-approved MOD site access for DoD funded PPS installation assistance
- Conduct Site Surveys & Vulnerability Assessments (VAs) to determine PPS weakness
 - Includes use of DOE Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security (ASSESS) system before and after PPS design
- Conduct PPS design based on Comprehensive PPS Suite goal to standardize systems throughout Russian Federation
- Procure and conduct check-out test of comprehensive suite of PPS equipment at SATC
- Install PPS equipment, including Quick Fix (if necessary) at MOD designated sites
- Conduct extensive PPS training at SATC
- *Schedule:* Estimated 7-9 years to complete PPS installation at all sites with current Russian vendors



CHALLENGES



- Positive execution on part of MOD in regards to previous agreement to allow site access required for DoD funded PPS installation
- Joint prioritization of site security upgrades and limited site information
- Effective use of Russian vendors for VA/Design/Installation/Training
- Efficient procurement and certification of Western manufactured PPS equipment
- Coordinating site access visits for verification of work progress
- Training the right MOD personnel to operate Comprehensive PPS equipment
- Number of sites (funding impact and subcontractor availability issue)
- Weather impact on PPS installation schedule
- Addressing protection of sensitive information
- Solving current de-certification work-stoppage issue



Conclusions

- The US/Russian Partnership in Nuclear Security Is an Innovative Way to Leverage the Knowledge of both Nuclear Security Establishments
- Knowledge gained in Russian Forces nuclear security can be applied to the RF biological and chemical security programs

